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Abstract 
This article explains the role of the convenience yield in the relationships linking spot and futures prices in 
commodity derivatives markets. First, this variable restores the non arbitrage relationship between the prices of 
the underlying asset and the derivative instrument. Second, it allows establishing connections between 
commodities and other assets. Third, it explains why firms store at an apparent loss. The convenience is however 
a controversial concept. Indeed, the absence of direct evidence for this quantity signifies, first that it is necessary 
to address the issue of estimating it and second, that it can be accused of being an ad hoc construction. 
Moreover, in spite of an early interest for this concept, there is no real consensus on its definition. This article 
aims at gathering all the reasonable explanations which were proposed trough time in the literature.  
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  Since 1939, the convenience yield plays a crucial role in the explanation of the relationships between 
spot and futures prices in commodity markets. It indeed appears as a way to explain backwardation, a situation 
where the futures price is lower than the spot price. Although the hedging pressure theory (previously called 
normal backwardation theory – see box 1) provides an alternative explanation for this phenomenon, the 
convenience yield is particularly appealing because it gives the possibility to establish a parallel between the 
commodities and other derivative markets, such as the markets for currencies, interest rates and equities. On the 
other hand, some authors consider that the convenience yield is nothing more than a variable artificially added in 
order to restore the no-arbitrage relationships, with no real economic significance. 
Is the convenience yield just an ad hoc construction, or does it have a real meaning? Is it useful for non 
storable commodities, like electricity or carbon emissions? This article aims to answer these questions. It is 
organized as follows. In a first section, it presents the role of the convenience yield in establishing a realistic 
relationship between spot and futures commodity prices. The second section opens the “black box”: it organizes 
the different explanations provided through time in order to justify the use of the convenience yield. The third 
section is devoted to modeling issues. The fourth is centered on empirical tests, the fifth comments on the 
different critiques that were addressed to the convenience yield. The last section examines the new questions 
arising with the emergence and growth of derivative markets for non storable commodities. Indeed, the concept 
was initially developed for storable commodities. 
                                                  
1 This article benefited from the financial support of the Chaire Finance et Développement durable (http://www.chairefdd.org/).   
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1.  The “non arbitrage relationship” in commodity markets 
 
The convenience yield is a central variable in the storage theory, which examines the information 
conveyed by futures prices and the discovery function of commodity derivative markets. To understand the 
relationships linking the spot and futures prices, this theory focuses on the reasons explaining the holding of 
inventories and examines the arbitrage operations undertaken by the operators between the physical and futures 
markets. In this theoretical framework, the role of inventory is crucial. Stocks indeed have a buffering effect: they 
absorb prices fluctuations. They also avoid disruptions in the flow of goods and services provided to the 
consumers. Lastly, they insure a link between the present and the future, allowing thus the inter-temporal 
allocation of the resource.  
Relying on stocks and arbitrage operations, the explanation of contango situations, where the futures 
price is higher than the spot price, is quite straightforward. The spread between futures and spot prices is related 
to the cost of holding the commodity over time:  
F(t,T) – S(t) = CS(t,T)        [1] 
where:        - F(t,T) is the futures prices at t for delivery at T, 
- S(t) is the spot price at t, 
- CS(t,T) represents the storage costs (carrying charges). 
The storage costs stand for fixed and variable costs. The fixed costs are due to insurance and 
warehouse expenses. They remain constant as long as the storage capacities are not saturated. The variable 
costs are due to deterioration and obsolescence, to the necessity to finance inventories and to maintenance 
expenses.  
In the presence of surplus stocks, the level of contango can not stay higher than the storage costs. 
Whenever such a situation occurs, cash and carry arbitrages restore the equilibrium: it becomes profitable to buy 
physical stocks in the spot market, to carry them and simultaneously to sell futures contracts. These sales lead to 
a decrease in the futures price, whereas the spot price increases as a result of inventory purchases. Finally, 
arbitrage opportunities disappear. When there are surplus stocks in the physical market, backwardation 
situations, where the spot price is higher than the futures price, are also impossible. In such a case, it would be 
possible to undertake a reverse cash and carry, namely to sell the stocks on the spot market and to purchase 
contracts on the futures market. The multiplication of such arbitrages would lead to a fall of the spot price, 
resulting from massive sales of physical stocks. Simultaneously, the futures price would rise under the influence 
of contracts’ purchases. These operations would stop when the difference between the futures and the spot 
prices becomes equal to the storage cost. 
Naturally, in this theoretical setting, a question arises: how is it possible to observe prices’ spreads 
inferior to full carrying charges? Some markets indeed are characterized by a persistent backwardation. It is a 
well-known phenomenon in the case of the crude oil market, as reported, for example, by Litzenberger and 
Rabinowitz (1995). It is illustrated by Figure 1. The latter represents the prices of the light sweet crude oil futures 
contracts negotiated on the New York Mercantile Exchange (Nymex), for two different maturities: 1 month (in   
  3
black) and 12 months (in blue). Due to the high fluctuations recorded from 1989 to 2008 the futures prices, which 
are quoted in dollars per barrel, are expressed in logarithm. The figure shows that in almost 20 years, the marked 
witnessed only three contango situations: in 1993-1994, in 1998, and more recently in 2005-2006.  
 


















































































































































































































According to Nicholas Kaldor’ (1939-1940), backwardation is possible because stocks of all goods 
possess a yield: the convenience yield. Let us at first define this variable as the remuneration associated with the 
holding of physical stocks. Let us also assume that it is all the more important that physical stocks are rare – we 
will provide more explanations in the next section. If we introduce the convenience yield in equation [1], the 
prices’ spread (also called the basis) becomes:  
F(t,T) – S(t) = CS(t,T) – Cy(t,T)        [2] 
where Cy(t,T) stands for the convenience yield2.  
  When the convenience yield becomes higher than storage costs, there is backwardation.  
Such a characterization of the relationship between spot and futures prices is consistent with the no-
arbitrage valuation of futures contracts on financial assets (currencies, interest rates, securities and stock 
indexes), where the futures price usually corresponds to the spot price, plus the financing costs related to the 
investment in the underlying asset, minus the remuneration of the underlying asset. For example, the futures 
price of a contract on fixed income securities should equal the cash market price of the underlying financial 
instrument, plus the carrying charges associated to this financial instrument (financing costs of the position on the 
cash market), minus the carry benefits (interest income). Likewise, the futures prices of an equity index should 
correspond to the financial cash value of the index, plus the financing costs on this index, minus the dividends on 
                                                  
2 This notation implicitly signifies that there are term structures of convenience yields. This article is however not focused on term structure relationships in 
commodity markets, the latter being only marginally mentioned in the fourth section. For more information on term structures, see for example Lautier 
(2005).    
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the carry period. Therefore, provided some adaptations are made, the storage theory gives the opportunity to 
apply the contingent claim analysis to commodities, because the convenience yield can be seen as the – implicit 
– remuneration on the underlying asset of the derivative instrument. This possibility to compare commodities with 
financial underlying assets partly explains the success of the storage theory, compared with the one of the 
hedging pressure theory (see box 1).  
 
Box 1. The hedging pressure theory  
Keynes introduced what he called the “normal backwardation theory” in 1930. In short, this theory specifies that in 
normal functioning conditions, the commodity market is characterized by a forward price that is inferior to the spot price. The 
relationship linking these two prices is due to the relative importance of short and long hedging positions in the futures 
market. Keynes assumes that the market in unbalanced: short hedging positions are inferior to long ones. The presence of 
the speculators is required in order to restore the equilibrium. Yet, speculators must be rewarded for the risks they 
experience in their professional activities. Thus, there must be a difference between the forward and the expected spot price: 
the risk premium; 
“...in normal conditions the spot price exceeds the forward price i.e. there is backwardation. In other words, the 
normal supply price on the spot includes remuneration for the risk of price fluctuation during the period of production, whilst 
the forward price excludes this.”3 
The critiques raised against the normal backwardation theory stand that even if this premium exists, chances are 
few that it is positive and constant. The works initiated by Dusak (1972), followed by Bodie and Rosansky (1980), Richard 
and Sundaresan (1981), as well as Bessembinder (1993) clearly illustrates that phenomenon. So the modern version of the 
theory only focuses on the hedging unbalance and its effects on the prices relationship. Hence it is called, since the work of 
de Roon et al (2000), the “hedging pressure theory”. 
 
The parallel with other financial markets must however be moderated. In commodity markets, negative 
prices spreads appear when stocks are low (the scarcity can be effective or expected).Thus, reverse cash and 
carry arbitrages are all the more unlikely that shortage is pronounced: the operators on the physical market do not 
have any interest in selling the merchandise as long as they expect an additional rise in the spot price. So the 
basis behaves not in the same way when it is positive and negative. In contango, there are surplus stocks and, as 
long as storage capacities are not saturated, the basis is stable and limited to the storage costs. In backwardation 
however, stocks are rare and the basis is solely determined by the spot price the operators are willing to pay in 
order to immediately obtain the merchandise. There is no subjective limit to the basis. Moreover, because 
inventories are not sufficiently abundant to absorb the fluctuations in the demand, the spot price is volatile, and so 
is the basis.  
  So, difficulties with arbitrage in commodity markets (see box 2) mean that even if the convenience yield 
restores the non arbitrage relationship between spot and futures prices, this relationship remains specific: the 
basis has an asymmetrical behavior, due to the non negativity constraint on inventories. The link between present 
and future exists; however, it is not perfect.  
 
 
                                                  
3 Keynes, 1930.    
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Box 2. The difficulties of arbitrage in commodity markets 
In commodity markets, there are at least six sources of imperfections which naturally influence the prices’ 
behaviour. 
z Arbitrage can be slowed down by difficulties associated to the localization of the delivery points of the futures 
contract of the commodity. Indeed, an operator undertaking a cash and carry between the physical and futures markets must 
necessarily deliver the commodity at the expiration of the contract. However, the wheat used as a support of the futures 
contract negotiated at the Chicago Board of Trade can be delivered in two places only: Duluth, or Chicago. Yet, these two 
towns are far from each other and for a buyer, it is not equivalent at all to receive the merchandise in one or the other places. 
On the other hand, the non ferrous metals underlying the futures contracts negotiated in the London Metal Exchange (LME) 
can be delivered in more than 60 different places in the world… which gives much more flexibility. Still, delivery is not evident 
so far. What if a British buyer is proposed to be delivered in Gdansk? Obviously, the question of delivery is not the same for 
commodities and Treasury Bonds, even when omitting some particular commodities, such as livestock which must be 
accommodated, cleaned and fed several times a day by the clearing house…  
z The storage costs and the necessity to have at one’s disposal storage capacities may also hinder arbitrage 
operations. In this respect, all operators are not created equal. As far as financial assets are concerned, the storage cost 
does not change from one operator to the other one: it amounts to the financing cost of the position. Things are different in 
the case of raw materials. For example, the wheat’s storage cost is not the same, according as one has at his disposal 
automated storage capacities or not. The storage cost strongly changes, in the case of petroleum, according as the 
capacities are located in warm or cold areas. Lastly, all the operators do not necessarily benefit from storage capacities.  
z The question of transport is another potential obstacle to arbitrage operations. Once again, all operators do not 
necessarily possess some transport capacities. Moreover, boats are not necessarily available in the right place and time! A 
shortage of boats for example, can lead to an immediate and extremely strong backwardation of the metals’ futures prices of 
the LME (in this kind of situation, rises of 40% in the nearest futures price of aluminium have been witnessed). A strike 
preventing from the exploitation of the unique railway used for the transportation of raw materials can hinder a delivery. And 
the seller who announces to the clearing house that he can’t meet its delivery commitment will probably discover that, as far 
as the clearing house is concerned, a strike is not a case of overpowering circumstances. Similarly, a strike having an impact 
on production can have a very important influence on prices… There is no strike in the production of Treasury Bonds.  
z Arbitrage can also become particularly because the regarded commodity is not storable. This is the case for 
electricity. In this situation, in order to benefit from sudden prices rises, one must have production capacities that 
simultaneously available and flexible. Hydraulic power plants are undoubtedly the most useful tool in this situation. Naturally, 
the fixed costs associated with such secondary capacities must be sustained when they are not used…  
z Merchandises are also not homogeneous in their quality. For example, light crude oils allow to obtain more 
gasoline than sour crude oils. A possible consequence of such quality differentials is the so-called phenomenon of the 
“cheapest to deliver”. At the time of delivery of a futures contract, the buyer can rationally expect that the seller will try to 
deliver the lowest quality of the commodity. This problem is very often mentioned and commented upon in the case of futures 
contracts on interest rates. It has always existed in the context of commodity markets. The trouble is, the problem of the 
cheapest on rye or oats can not be solved thanks to the calculation of a concordance factor. Thus, it might have an influence 
on prices. 
z Finally, in most of the financial markets, in order to undertake arbitrage operations, it is possible to borrow the 
assets and to carry out short sales. This is not possible in the case of commodities. Who, in backwardation, would take the 
risk to leave his merchandise during a few weeks or months and sustain a production’s disruption?  
 
2.  The motivations for stock holding 
Different kind of explanations where provided through time in the literature for the concept of the 
convenience yield and the motivations explaining storage behavior. We propose to collect and organize them into 
three categories: the ones that justify stock holding for speculation purposes, those who stress the advantages of   
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inventories as a way to avoid frictions, and those interested in the insurance against stock-out provided by with 
stock holding.  
z Stocks and speculation  
  Speculation is frequently invoked to explain the storage behavior of precious metals. For the other 
commodities, it is easier to speculate with futures than with physical inventories. This does not mean, however, 
that stock holding is totally free from speculative motives. As soon as in 1958, while focusing on the convenience 
yield, Brennan states that stocks give the possibility to benefit from an unexpected rise in the demand without 
having to wait for supply: 
  “The convenience yield is attributed to the advantage [ ...] of being able to take advantage of a 
rise in demand and price without resorting to a revision of the production schedule.” 
The speculative motive is also retained by Routledge Seppi and Spatt (2000). They consider that trading 
profit is the only motive for holding inventory, as far as stocks in excess of those irreversibly committed to 
production are concerned. In such a situation, stocks can be seen as a way to allocate resources in time. They 
result from the relation between the present and expected spot prices. This relationship has been pointed out by 
Deaton and Laroque in 1992. They showed that in equilibrium, the profit maximization of the trader in the physical 
commodity market implies the following “no arbitrage” conditions:  
[ ]
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Where:  - I(t) is the quantity stored at t, 
 -  θ is a discounting factor4  
 -  Et[.] is the expectation operator at t, 
 -  S(t) is the spot price at t.  
This relationship is interesting because it stresses the physical non negativity constraint on stocks which 
characterizes commodity markets. However, as long as the speculative motive is retained, nothing is said about 
stocks held in backwardation.  
 
z Stocks and frictions  
Nicholas Kaldor was the first to propose the notion of a convenience yield. His definition implicitly relies 
on frictions in order to explain the storage behaviour when prices’ spreads are lower than carrying charges. 
According to him, when he holds inventory, an operator has the commodity at his disposal as soon as he needs 
it, and he doesn’t have to bear the cost associated to frequent orders. Nor does he have to wait for delivery. This 
advantage is all the more appreciated that the level of stocks is low: 
“In normal circumstances, stocks of all goods possess a yield, measured in terms of themselves, 
and this yield which is a compensation to the holder of stocks, must be deducted from carrying 
costs proper in calculating net carrying cost. The latter can, therefore, be negative or positive.”5 
                                                  
4 This discounting factor usually stands for financing costs and obsolescence. If r is the interest rate and β stands for obsolescence, then : θ = (1- β)/(1+r). 
5 Kaldor, 1939.   
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So physical stocks give the possibility to avoid the cost of waiting for delivery; this explains their 
presence in backwardated markets. The definition proposed by Brennan (1958) relies at least partially on the 
same argumentation. In 1986, Williams provides another explanation. He claims that, as for money, there is a 
transaction demand for inventories. The latter indeed give the possibility to undertake transactions immediately; 
they insure the access to the merchandise. The transaction demand is due to transformation costs, which are 
much higher for commodities than for money. They stand, first for the costs of buying and selling the commodity, 
second for processing and transportation expenses. As the example presented in Box n°3 illustrates it, there is a 
transaction demand even when there is no uncertainty. In the same vein, in 2004, Bobenrieth et al. propose to 
introduce marketing costs in the analysis. According to them, stocks are held neither because they are profitable 
to keep, nor because they avoid the cost of delivery: they are only expensive to sell.  
Box 3. The transaction demand for inventories (Williams, 1986) 
Let us consider a framework with two periods t1 and t2. Just after the harvest, a farmer possesses W bushels of 
wheat. He can sell them at t1 and/or at t2. The amount marketed at ti, wi, is such that w1 + w2 = W. There is no uncertainty: 
the prices p1 and p2 are known. Suppose now that there is backwardation, in that the spot price of wheat is higher than the 
discounted future price: p1 > ∂ p2, where ∂ is the discounting factor.  
In such a simple model, when there are no marketing costs, it is optimal to sell W at t1. There is no incentive to 
store the commodity, as suggested by equation [3]. Let us now introduce marketing costs in the analysis, and let us assume 
that they can be characterized by a non linear function, such as cw2, where c is a positive constant. With these costs, the 
optimal storage policy must maximize the present value of the farmer’s profit, that is to say:  
( ) ( )
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The farmer is concerned with finding the optimal amount w2 that will be stored in the first period and marketed at t2. 
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Thus, even if the spot price is higher than the discounted future price, when transaction costs are introduced in the 
analysis, positive inventories will be carried from the first to the second period, as long as the following relationship holds:  
12 2 p δpc W − <  
Consequently, even if there is no uncertainty on prices, there is still a transaction demand for inventories.  
All these explanations share some common points. First, stock holding is explained without relying on 
uncertainty in the demand and/or in the supply side. Second, the motives of the operators in the physical market 
are guided by the presence of different kind of frictions. The latter may be external – this is the case for the 
furnishing delay – as well as internal – as for manipulation or marketing costs.  
z Inventory as an insurance against shortages 
The last category of definitions proposed for the convenience yield considers inventory as an insurance 
against stock-out. Brennan (1958) stress the advantage of being able to keep regular customers satisfied. 
Working (1949) relies on the presence of high fixed costs in storage activity and on the necessity to avoid a 
disruption of activity. Through the concept of stock-out yield, Weymar (1968) also refers to the presence of high 
fixed costs in production and processing activities. The stock-out yield is linked to the necessity to ensure the 
continuity of the production. The more important is the risk of a disruption, the more rises the stock-out yield: it is   
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a decreasing function of stocks level. In this context, physical stocks are hold in backwardation because 
production, storage, transportation and processing capacities are not adjusted to the level of activity: there is 
overcapacity. Such a situation can be due either to the seasonality of commodities or to a mistake in the forecast 
of the activity level when capacities were built. As for Williams (1986), he invokes the precautionary demand for 
inventories as a response, first to the uncertainty that affects the forthcoming supply and/or demand of the 
commodity, second to the transformation costs (transportation, processing and marketing costs). Box n°4 
illustrates this notion.   
Box 4. The precautionary demand for inventories (Williams, 1986) 
In this example, the precautionary demand comes from the rigidity and uncertainty of the production process.  
Picture a miller with a fixed production capacity K and a variable cost corresponding to the price of the raw material 
employed (wheat or corn). This production process is rigid: the firm loses money as soon as it does not operate at full 
capacity. The miller is concerned with minimizing his expected shortage costs.  
In this model, there is also uncertainty. The firm indeed is unable to control the amount of wheat being forwarded to 
it, and its time to arrival. In order to avoid shortage costs, the miller holds a precautionary stock I.  
Let f(z) being the probability that a particular amount of commodity, z, arrives. If this amount is to low to operate at 
full capacity, the firm will suffer a shortage cost:  
(K – I – z) c, 
where c is the constant loss from the shortage.  
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The problem is how much inventory to keep in hand in order to avoid these costs. In other words, the miller must sole an 
exercise in inventory control, in which he must find an equilibrium between shortage and storage costs.  
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In this setting, the secure amount of raw material I stands for a line of credit: it gives immediate access to the commodity. PA 
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The optimal inventory is where the price of holding the marginal unit of inventory equals the expected cost of storage.  
In this context, two arguments simultaneously explain stock holding in backwardation: the uncertainty 
affecting demand and supply and the rigidity of industrial and commercial activities including the merchandises. 
This rigidity finds its expression in the impossibility, for the operators, to quickly adopt their supply to a variation in 
the demand.  
3.  Modeling issues 
The convenience yield was represented in different ways trough time in the literature. Its simple use as a 
tool to restore the no-arbitrage relationship gives rise to the conclusion that the convenience yield should be a 
negative function of the stocks’ level. The convenience yield is high when stocks are rare, the holding of stocks 
being more valuable in this circumstance. Conversely, it is low when there are surplus stocks in the physical   
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markets. Moreover, as stocks and spot prices are also negatively correlated, the convenience yield is a positive 
function of the spot price. Consequently, the most easy and intuitive way to represent the convenience yield is to 
regard it as a positive and deterministic function of the spot price, like in Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Gibson 
and Schwartz (1989) and Brennan (1991). 
As soon as in 1989, however, Gibson and Schwartz suggest that the convenience yield may not be 
perfectly correlated to the spot price and could instead be regarded as a stochastic variable having a mean 
reverting behavior. This formalization has been chosen by, among others, Gibson and Schwartz (1990), Schwartz 
(1997), Schwartz (1998) and Cortazar and Schwartz (2003):  
( ) CC dC κα Cd tσ dz ⎡⎤ =− + ⎣⎦      [4] 
with:   κ, σC >0 
where:    - C is the convenience yield, 
- α is the long run mean of the convenience yield, 
- κ is the speed of adjustment, 
-  C σ  is the volatility, 
- dzC is an increment to a standard Brownian motion associated with C.  
Applying a mean reverting behavior to the convenience yield implies that stocks have the capacity to 
reconstitute themselves, and that there is a level of stocks which satisfies the needs of the industry in normal 
conditions. The behavior of the operators guarantees that this level is maintained. When the convenience yield is 
low, stocks are abundant and they bear a high storage cost reckoning the poor benefits associated with the 
holding of the merchandise. Consequently, if they are rational they will try to reduce this surplus inventories. 
Conversely, in the case of a shortage, the operators will try to reconstitute their stocks.  
The formalization proposed by Schwartz (1997) is especially interesting: not only does he retain a mean 
reverting behavior for the convenience yield, but he also introduces this variable in the spot price’s dynamic. Thus 
– marginally – the former gives to the latter a mean reverting behavior. More importantly, the convenience yield 
becomes a stochastic dividend influencing the drift of the spot price. This representation states explicitly the 
convenience yield as a profit associated with the holding of inventories and facilitates the comparison with other 
financial assets, such as stocks or bonds.  
Meanwhile, the formalization gained in complexity, as the authors began to take into account the non-
negativity constraint on inventory. These works were initiated by Brennan, in 1991. The author claims that the 
convenience yield has an asymmetrical behavior and is downward limited. More precisely, the convenience yield 
net of storage costs can not be lower than the opposite of storage costs. The latter are supposed constant for a 
large range of prices, as long as the storage capacities are not saturated. In their model, Routledge, Seppi and 
Spatt (2000) suppose that the correlation between the spot price and the convenience yield is higher in 
backwardation than in contango. While being stochastic, the convenience yield is an endogenous variable which 
is caused by the storage process. Lastly, Lautier and Galli (2001) propose a generalized version of Schwartz’ 
model (1997), where the convenience yield is mean reverting but is also higher in backwardation than in 
contango.  
An option being, above all, an asymmetrical asset, all these works can be considered as a first step 
towards the representation of the convenience yield as a real option. In this context, the convenience yield is 
represented as a call option on inventory. According to Heinkel, Howes, and Hughes (1990), the option lies in the 
possibility offered by the inventory to profit from an unexpected rise in the demand. In their model, the   
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convenience yield is a decreasing function of the stock level and an increasing function of production costs. In 
Milonas and Henker (2001), the value of the call is zero if there is no disruption in the production cycle. When the 
stock rises, the probability of a disruption diminishes, as well as the option’s value. Likewise, the more the price of 
the underlying asset is volatile, the more the option value increases. The theoretical framework is however 
restricted to a single production cycle, beginning when stocks are bought and finishing when they are entirely 
sold. It is well suited for seasonal commodities like agricultural products, but more questionable for industrial raw 
materials such as metals, where production cycles do not have a strong influence on prices in the short run. 
Relying on Longstaff (1995), Heaney (2002) proposes an approximation of the real option’s value associated with 
the convenience yield, where the trader holding the commodity is assumed to know when the price reaches its 
highest value over the period of storage. This model provides a maximum value for the call option.  
4.  Empirical evidence 
The concept of convenience yield has given rise to two different kind of empirical tests. The first directly rely 
on stock data in order to give evidence of a convenience yield in commodity markets. Recognizing the difficulties 
in obtaining reliable stock data, the second preferably rely on price data and perform indirect tests. Even if this 
second category is interesting, our aim being to see whether or not the convenience yield is something else than 
an ad-hoc “correction” of the prices relationship in commodity markets, we will focus on the first. As far as the 
second category is concerned, let us only point out that the different models mentioned above were most of the 
time empirically validated with quite a large consensus.  
If there is a convenience yield related to physical ownership, then the holding of inventory in backwardated 
markets becomes rational. Thus a first step towards the justification of the concept lies in empirical observations 
linking the stocks level and prices spreads. As soon as in 1933, Working presented a stylized “supply of storage 
curve” which, as illustrated by Figure 2, is a non linear and negative relationship between inventory and prices 
spreads. Noticeably, on the wheat market, firms do store commodities at a loss: when prices spreads become 
negative, the stock level remains around 50 millions of bushels.  
Figure 2. Working curve for wheat: US commercial stocks 
 
Source : Carter & Giha (2007)   
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Empirical estimates of the supply of storage generally confirmed this result, on an important number of 
commodity markets, as illustrated by Table 1.  
Table 1. Empirical evidence of the Working curve through time and commodity markets: a few examples 
Author(s)   Commodity market(s)  Date 
Brennan 
           Telser 
Weymar 
Gray & Peck 
Thompson 
Williams and Whright 
Cho & Mc Dougall 
Brennan, Williams & Wright 
Carter & Giha 
Lin & Duan 





















This negative relationship between stocks and prices may be considered as an evidence of the existence of 
a convenience yield. With time, the analysis of this empirical phenomenon became more and more precise. As 
soon as 1958, Telser suggests that the convenience yield associated with strategic government stocks is lower 
than the convenience yield of industrial stocks. Thompson (1986) shows that the price-stock relationship can be 
stronger when local stocks are taken into account, instead of worldwide stocks. Williams and Wright (1989) 
confirm this result with stocks certified by the exchange. Indeed, a difficulty arising when considering inventory is 
that there are several kind of stocks: on can consider physical versus paper inventories; speculative and/or 
industrial stocks, strategic and/or non strategic stocks, stocks that are underground (for mineral reserves) or not, 
stocks certified by the clearing house or not, etc. Obviously, the results of the empirical tests change with the 
category which is taken into account. This remark constitutes the basis of the main critique addressed to the 
convenience yield.  
5.  Critiques 
The absence of direct evidence of convenience yield gives rises to critiques. Two categories of objections 
were raised. The first is associated to the non observable nature of convenience yield. Indeed, there is no real 
traded asset corresponding to this variable. This objection is however irrelevant: in the field of finance any 
expected variable is non observable. It is the case, for example, for futures spot prices or for expected inflation.  
The second category of objection is more serious. It was initiated by Williams and Wright (1989). They claim 
that the convenience yield is an artifact of an aggregation problem. Stocks indeed may group together, in 
homogeneous statistical data, some different commodities, which are not really substitutable, because they are 
characterized by quality differential, and / or because they are situated in different locations, that are far away 
from each others. In such a situation, storage under backwardation may occur, not because there is an implicit   
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remuneration associated to inventories, but because aggregated stock data give a false image of the price-
inventory relationship.  
 A possible answer to such a critique is that when a very restrictive kind of stock – namely those certified by 
the clearing house – is retained in order to analyze the relationship between stocks and prices, there is still 
evidence of positive stocks in backwardation. Thus, even if the convenience yield is probably often 
overestimated, it is impossible to deny that firms store stocks at an apparent loss in commodity markets. 
Consequently, whatever the name we put on it, the physical ownership of the commodity obviously carries a flow 
of services.  
 
6.  What about non storable commodities?  
The emergence and development of derivative markets for “non storable” commodities, like electricity or 
carbon, challenge the concept of the convenience yield, which was initially proposed in the context of storable 
commodities. Is it possible to keep it in this new context? What will it stand for, in this situation? The answer given 
in this article is tentative, as the subject and the markets are recent6.  
As far as electricity is concerned, only a small part of the total production of electricity (namely 
hydroelectricity) is storable. Thus, is the concept of convenience yield irrelevant for power markets? Géman 
(2005) claims that the convenience yield cannot be extended to electricity. The latter being a non storable 
commodity, there is no possibility of carrying it over time. However, she considers the convenience yield as it is 
most currently defined. Provided that a larger definition is retained, the concept can remain useful. As is the case 
for most commodities production process, power plants indeed require investing very high amount of capital. 
Moreover, the so called committed generation units7, kept as a reserve, have a role in power markets which is 
comparable to that of inventories.  
The context of the carbon market being quite different depending on the geographical area is concerned; this 
article will focus on the European one. This market on emission rights was launched in two phases: 2005-2007 
and 2008-2012. The carbon market is a bit specific as until now, it is not possible to store the underlying asset of 
the futures contracts, namely the carbon – even if the CSC (Carbone Storage and Capture) technology is quickly 
improving. It is however possible to store the emission rights, at least, since 20088. Others characteristics of the 
carbon market are first, that the pure storage cost of CO2 allowances is zero, and second that their supply is 
punctual. Consequently, if as claimed by Trück et al (2007) or Daskalis et al (2009), there is a convenience yield 
associated to the permits, it is probably only due to the scarcity of CO2 allowances, which might be either 
observed or expected. Moreover, the form of the supply function of the emission rights should induce a cyclical 
                                                  
6 It is generally accepted that a derivative market is mature when it is 10 to 15 years old. The immaturity of the market renders the analysis of prices 
behavior spurious.  
7 “A generation unit is said to be committed if it can be turned on, brought up to the desirable speed and connected to the system in order to deliver power to 
the network, all these steps taking place in a very short amount of time” (Géman, 2005). 
8 The first period of the European market, from 2005 to 2007, was a trial period characterized by a banking prohibition: it was impossible to save the permits 
from the first to the second phase. Thus, it has exhibited very specific prices’ behavior. Uhrig-Hombourg and Wagner (2008) claim that the contango 
observed during the first period is due to carbon markets’ immaturity and does not extend to the second period. The banking restriction prevents the cost-of-
carry approach from working across the different phases. Daskalakis et al (2009) also mention that the banking mechanism has a significant effect on 
futures prices.    
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behavior for the convenience yield. Trück et al (2007) call it a seasonal behavior, whereas Daskalis et al (2009) 
refer to mean reversion. 
 
7.  Conclusion  
This article explains the role of the convenience yield in the relationship between spot and futures prices in 
commodity derivatives markets. This variable is essential for several reasons. First, it is a tool that explains 
backwardation in commodity markets. Second, it allows establishing conceptual and methodological links 
between commodity derivatives markets and other assets, like bonds, stocks, and currencies. Such links can be 
very useful, as illustrated by the success of the analogy between financial and real options. Third, it explains why 
firms keep storing commodities at negative prices spreads.  
The convenience is however a controversial concept. Indeed, even if its first formulations go back to the 
beginning of the twentieth century, there is no real consensus on its definition. The one deliberately retained in 
this article is as large as possible. It aims at explaining backwardation in commodity markets and gathering the 
reasonable explanations, having an economical meaning, that were proposed trough time in the literature. In such 
a context, it is not limited to physical inventories and it can be exploited for “non storable” commodities such as 
electricity or carbon.  
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